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Richard Lavoie*
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ABSTRACT: In recent years the question of whether lawyers have a general ethical
obligation to serve a gatekeeping function has been raised in a number of
legal contexts. The reaction of the practicing bar generally has been
unenthusiastic. While asserting that a gatekeeping function should be
generally applicable to all attorneys is a relatively recent stance, such an
obligation historically has been acknowledged to various degrees in
several specific practice areas, including particularly in the field of
federal income taxation. This piece examines the gatekeeping question,
and how the practicing bar should react to it, through an examination of
the gatekeeping role historically asserted as applicable to tax lawyers,
including how modern pressures (e.g., literalist statutory interpretation,
profit maximization law firm models, changing business and societal
ethical norms, etc.) have altered that historically asserted ethical norm.
The article then suggests avenues for combating these modern trends in
the tax arena in order to strengthen and reestablish the historic balance in
a tax lawyer’s planning role (e.g., by creating intentional conflicts of
interest to create a “divide and conquer” dynamic between clients and
attorneys in aggressive transactions, emphasizing the ethical training of
tax attorneys, clarifying the proper approach for statutory interpretation
in the tax context, creating disincentives for a legal race to the bottom
among attorneys competing for business, highlighting the importance of
individual trend setters, channeling the competitive pressures in the legal
marketplace in the government’s favor, etc.). The piece concludes with
some closing thoughts regarding the lessons that the practicing bar might
take from the tax gatekeeping example in their future reactions to
gatekeeping initiatives in other areas of the law and accepting
gatekeeping as a generally applicable ethical norm.
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“And the LORD said unto Cain, Where is Abel thy brother? And he said, I know not: Am I my
brother’s keeper?” 1
I.

Introduction
The essence of the relationship between a lawyer and a client traditionally has

been that of a zealous advocate. As Lord Henry Brougham famously stated:
An advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in
all the world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all
means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other
persons, and, amongst them, to himself, is his first and only duty;
and in performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the
torments, the destruction which he may bring upon others.
Separating the duty of a patriot from that of an advocate, he must
go on reckless of the consequences, though it should be his
unhappy fate to involve his country in confusion.2 [Emphasis
added.]
In modern times Lord Brougham’s admonition that a lawyer should not consider the societal
consequences of zealously defending a client has been questioned.3 More recently, some have
gone even farther and questioned whether lawyers generally have an affirmative obligation to act

1

GENESIS 4:9.
2 THE TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 3 (1821). To understanding the full import of the
emphasized language it is necessary to place Lord Brougham’s statement in its historical context.
Queen Caroline was popular with the masses but had been charged with adultery. However, her
husband King George IV also had a secret indiscretion. While he was heir-apparent, the King
had secretly married a Catholic. If this fact became known, the King would have lost his own
title pursuant to the Law of Settlement. The quoted language was part of Lord Brougham’s
opening statement in defense of Queen Caroline and represented a direct threat that Lord
Brougham would not hesitate to produce this evidence against the King if required to defend his
client, no matter the resulting confusion and tumult to the country. Monroe H. Freedman, Henry
Lord Brougham, Written by Himself, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1213, 1215 (2006).
3
See, e.g., William Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional
Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29 (1978); David Luban, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY
(1988); Deborah Rhode, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION
(2000); Robert Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1988).
2

as gatekeepers safeguarding the structure and purpose of the law.4 Indeed, in the realm of the
securities laws, Congress and the Securities Exchange Commission have moved to require
lawyers to assume a pro-active gatekeeping role in policing their clients’ actions via legislation,5
regulations6 and prosecutions.7
While the idea that gatekeeping is a general obligation of all lawyers is relatively
new, the tax bar in the United States has been debating whether it has a special gatekeeping
obligation almost since the inception of the income tax.8 Over most of the modern income tax
era the prevailing view of commentators has been that the unique nature of the tax system
requires tax lawyers to have an ethical obligation to create, nurture and promote a fair tax
4

See e.g., Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement
Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986); John C. Coffee, Jr., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS
AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2006); Arthur B. Laby, Differentiating Gatekeepers, 1 BROOK.
J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 119 (2006); W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99
NW. U.L. REV. 1167 (2005). The gatekeeping role envisioned in these works goes well beyond
the traditionally accepted notion that a lawyer is an “officer of the court” and therefore cannot
knowingly make false statements to a tribunal, fail to disclose controlling adverse authority, etc.
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.3 and associated comment.
5
See e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) § 307, 15
U.S.C. § 7245 (2002) (directing the SEC to adopt certain rules of minimum professional conduct
for attorneys) and § 602(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78d- 3(a) (2002) (allowing administrative actions against
attorneys and accountants to censure, suspend, or bar them from appearing or practicing before
the SEC).
6
See 17 C.F.R. Part 205 (implementing Sarbanes-Oxley § 307) and 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)
(allowing SEC to censure and bar attorneys from appearing or practicing before the SEC). See
also, Roger Cramton, George Cohen & Susan Koniak, Legal and Ethical Duties of Lawyers After
Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L. REV. 725, 740 (2004).
7
George W. Dent, Jr., Lawyers In The Crosshairs: The New Legal And Ethical Duties Of
Corporate Attorneys: Introduction, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 337, 338 (2007) (Noting that “SEC
enforcement actions [against attorneys] have mushroomed. There is also concern that . . . the
SEC has altered its enforcement program, and now under [its censure/suspension authority] it
pursues attorneys allegedly guilty of nothing worse than negligence. Private damage actions
against lawyers also seem to have increased.”).
8
See generally, Michael Hatfield, Legal Ethics and Federal Taxes, 1945-1965: Patriotism,
Duties and Advice, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 1 (2012). Indeed, law review discussions regarding how
far a tax practitioner can go in counseling tax reduction strategies to clients can be found as early

system.9 Additionally, as a practical matter, most tax practitioners likely conducted their affairs
in a manner consistent with such a role even if they did not specifically endorse gatekeeping as
an actual ethical requirement.10 However, with the advent of widespread lawyer assisted tax
shelters activity in the 1970s and the 1990s, this reality began to change. Despite academic
protestations to the contrary, an ethical gatekeeping norm has, as both a formal and practical
matter, been increasingly questioned, and seemingly rejected, by a large segment of the tax bar in
recent decades.11 This lack of self-regulation has opened the door for the federal government12

as the 1920s. See, e.g., John H. Sears, Effective and Lawful Avoidance of Taxes, 8 VA. L. REV.
77, 85 (1921).
9
William H. Simon, Organizational Representation and the Frontiers of Gatekeeping,19 AM.
U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 1069, 1073 (2011) (“there is a longstanding tradition within the
elite tax bar that embraces the gatekeeping role”); BERNARD WOLFMAN, JAMES P. HOLDEN &
KENNETH L. HARRIS, STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE § 101.2 (1999 5th ed.) (“The practitioner’s
obligation to the client, however, is not unrestricted. The practitioner also owes a duty, albeit
less well-defined, to the tax system as a whole.”); Franklin Green, Exercising Judgment in the
Wonderland Gymnasium, 90 TAX NOTES 1691, 1692-93 (Mar. 19, 2001) (“[I]t has been a
fundamental role of tax practitioners to identify for taxpayers those tax return positions that may
be attempted and those that are beyond the pale.… In a real sense, the tax adviser is a gatekeeper
who regulates the flow of issues into the system…. For self-assessment to be workable, tax
advisers cannot fail to perform their gatekeeper function and cannot allow a floodtide of
illegitimate issues to swamp the system. Accordingly, it is imperative that tax advisers apply
professional standards with intellectual honesty in determining what positions have enough
credibility to be able to be asserted.”); Deborah H. Schenk, Book Review: Tax Ethics, 95 HARV.
L. REV. 1995, 2005 (1982). For a detailed compendium of the leading tax ethics commentators
on this point from the 1945-1965 period, see Hatfield, supra note 8, at 15-28.
10
That is, it was in the professional best interest of the practitioner to be seen by the taxing
authorities as having high standards so that he would be in the best position to represent his
client’s interests and to foster a less adversarial relationship between taxpayers and the
government to everyone’s mutual benefit. Id. at 27-28.
11
See e.g., William H. Simon, After Confidentiality: Rethinking the Professional Responsibility
of the Business Lawyer, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453, 1457-58 (2007) (noting dichotomy within
tax bar between tax shelter “formalists” and anti-tax shelter practitioners who assert a duty to the
tax system); Richard Lavoie, Deputizing the Gunslingers: Co-Opting the
Tax Bar into Dissuading Corporate Tax Shelters, 21 VA. TAX REV. 43 (2001) (discussing
attorney complicity in tax shelter activity and advocating for a return to a tax lawyer gatekeeping
function); Tanina Rostain, Sheltering Lawyers: The Organized Tax Bar and the Tax Shelter
Industry, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 77 (2006) (same); David J. Moraine, Loyalty Divided: Duties to
Clients and Duties to Others--the Civil Liability of Tax Attorneys Made Possible by the

to insert itself into the attorney-client relationship by both implicitly and explicitly regulating and
proscribing attorney behavior.13 In the wake of these changes, but coinciding with the severe
economic downturn since 2008, promoted tax shelter activity of the type prevalent in the 1990s
and early 2000s appears to have subsided.14
However, tax shelter activity can take many forms. The factors that led to the
decline of the tax bar’s gatekeeping role in the 1970s and 1990s are still largely with us today

Acceptance of a Duty to the System, 63 TAX LAW. 169 (2009) (advocating for the rejection of any
tax practitioner duty to the system).
12
In the tax context federal government action can take many forms, from Congressional
legislation to administrative actions. On the administrative axis the Treasury Department has
primary responsibility for interpreting and administering the tax laws. Primary responsibility for
developing tax policy and reviewing tax regulations resides in the Treasury’s Office of Tax
Policy. However, the largest bureau within the Treasury Department is the Internal Revenue
Service which has been delegated the responsibility for determining, assessing and collecting the
revenue owed by taxpayers. Other Executive Branch agencies also have ancillary tax functions
as well. For instance, the Tax Division of the Department of Justice handles most tax litigation
functions for the government. This article will use the term “Government” to generally refer to
the entire panoply of legislative and executive aspects of the federal government that can play a
role in regard to regulating attorneys generally, and in particular tax practitioners. The Internal
Revenue Service itself will sometimes be referred to as either the “IRS” or the “Service.”
13
See Part III, infra. See also, Rachelle Y Holmes, The Tax Lawyer as Gatekeeper, 49 U.
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 185 (2010) (advocating for the Government to do even more to formalize
the gatekeeping functions of tax attorneys); Bret Wells, Voluntary Compliance: “This Return
Might Be Correct But Probably Isn’t”, 29 VA. TAX REV. 645 (2010) (advocating that a “more
likely than not” tax return position standard be applicable for all taxpayers and advisors). For
more generalized discussions of the evolving role of the Government in prescribing the ethical
responsibilities of lawyers in various areas, see Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73
TEX. L. REV. 335 (1994); Daniel R. Coquillette and Judith A. McMorrow, Zacharias’s
Prophecy: The Federalization of Legal Ethics through Legislative, Court, and Agency
Regulations, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 123 (2011); Eli Wald, Federalizing Legal Ethics,
Nationalizing Law Practice, and the Future of the American Profession in a Global Age, 48 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 489 (2011).
14
Tracy A. Kaye, The Regulation of Corporate Tax Shelters in the United States, 58 AM. J.
COMP. L. 585, 604 (2010) (noting that while corporate tax shelter activity has decreased it is
likely to return when the economy improves if the Government is not vigilant); Susan Cleary
Morse, The How and Why of the New Public Corporation Tax Shelter Compliance Norm, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 961 (2006) (arguing that compliance norms at large corporations were
strengthened by the Government’s responses to the most recent wave of corporate tax shelter
activity).

despite recent Government actions. It remains to be seen whether the next economic upswing
will reignite the tax shelter industry as well, despite the recently erected roadblocks.15 If so,
what role will tax practitioners play? Will they resume a strong gatekeeping role and act to
quash these new tax shelter schemes in their infancy? Or, will they adhere to Lord Brougham’s
mantra and again plunge the tax system into disarray and confusion? If the latter, then the tax
bar can expect the Government to place ever more draconian restrictions on them to dissuade
their complicity in undermining the fairness and integrity of the tax system.
A central thesis of this article is that, it is in the self-interest of all the parties
involved to take decisive action now to return to and strengthen the tax bar’s historical
gatekeeping function. The Government benefits by obtaining more accurate taxpayer reporting
of transactions and avoiding the substantial distraction of dealing with yet another tax shelter
crisis. Society benefits by having a stronger and fairer system of taxation that in turn bolsters the
taxpaying commitment of all taxpayers.16 Attorneys benefit by preserving their ability to selfregulate as a profession, maintaining their status as professionals, and preserving more latitude in
assisting their clients in non-abusive tax situations.17 Clients benefit from being able to receive
freer tax advice in structuring ordinary course business motivated transactions (which advice
might be curtailed inadvertently as a consequence of stricter governmental involvement in
15

Kaye, supra note 14, at 604; sources cited at infra note 106.
See generally, Richard Lavoie, Flying Above the Law and Below the Radar: Instilling a
Taxpaying Ethos in Those Playing by Their Own Rules, 29 PACE L. REV. 637 (2009).
17
Kenneth M. Rosen, Lessons on Lawyers, Democracy, and Professional Responsibility, 19
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 155, 167 (2006) (“if lawyers are unwilling to recommit themselves to the
regulation of their profession and their responsibilities to society, one might expect additional
regulations [regarding attorney behavior].”); David B. Wilkins, Doing Well By Doing Good? The
Role Of Public Service In The Careers Of Black Corporate Lawyers, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 83
(2004) (“such sacred cows as self-regulation and the attorney-client privilege are likely to come
under great pressure if lawyers lose their reputation as a ‘public profession’ dedicated to the
public interest.”).

16

attorney regulation) and by avoiding the time, expense and angst of ultimately trying to defend
abusive transactions before the Government and in the court of public opinion.18
While at one point the gatekeeping concept was thought to be sui generis to the
realm of taxation, that position is no longer viable today. Over the years the legal environment
has evolved from a broad constitutional and common law base into one increasingly focused on
complex statutory schemes that are implemented and administered by regulatory agencies. Thus,
the primary factor that prompted calls for tax gatekeeping (i.e., the practical inability of the
Government to comprehensively check and monitor adherence to the law, which thus
necessitates a system of voluntary self-compliance by citizens) has emerged as a central reality in
most regulatory contexts. The calls we see today for increased attorney gatekeeping functions in
other areas of the law derive largely from the Government’s recognition that it cannot effectively
curtail unjustified citizen behavior without the help of the practicing lawyers working in that area
to promote compliance by their clients. Just as in the field of taxation, if those attorneys fail
embrace a gatekeeping function on their own initiative, the Government can be expected to
impose one on them which may well not be to their, or their clients’, liking. The primary lesson
to be learned from the tax experience with gatekeeping, is the importance of preserving as much
of the attorney-client relationship as possible by embracing self-regulation as a means of preempting more draconian changes that would otherwise be likely to occur.
18

See Michele Destefano Beardslee, Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion, Installment One:
Broadening the Role of Corporate Attorneys, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1259 (2009), Michele
Destefano Beardslee, Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion, Installment Two: How Far
Should Corporate Attorneys Go?, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1119 (2010) (advocating in favor of
corporate attorneys providing advice regarding public opinion aspects of corporate transactions
in light of results from empirical survey study). See also, Kathleen F. Brickey, From Boardroom
to Courtroom to Newsroom: The Media and the Corporate Governance Scandals, 33 J. CORP. L.
625, 636 (2008); David M. Sudbury, The Role of Corporate Counsel in the Criminal
Environmental Case: Advice to Quench the Fire, 3 VILL. ENVT’L. L.J. 95. 110 (1992).

Part II of the article discusses the history, theory and practice of gatekeeping
within the tax bar. Part III highlights the decline in such gatekeeping activity as evidenced by
the rampant tax shelter activity in recent times, and identifies some of the key factors that led to
the weakening, and apparent abandonment, of the tax bar’s traditional gatekeeping role. Part IV
examines the potential risks to all parties involved if the tax bar’s gatekeeping role is not
resurrected and discusses how a consensus in favor of an ethical gatekeeping norm can be forged
despite the competitive and other pressures pushing the bar in the opposite direction. Part V
notes that while the current legal landscape presents difficult terrain on which to foster a strong
gatekeeping norm, a concerted effort by all concerned can successfully entrench this norm to the
ultimate benefit of all involved. That Part then concludes by finding that the tax gatekeeping
example is highly relevant to other areas of the law where commentators and the Government are
suggesting an attorney gatekeeping function is appropriate.
II.

Tax Lawyers as Gatekeepers
A.

What Does Tax “Gatekeeping” Entail?
Lord Brougham’s standard of zealous advocacy stakes out a clear threshold for

the extent to which an attorney can ethically consider the consequences of his actions to those
other than his client. In short, he can’t.19 However, once it is granted that an attorney may, or
must, ethically consider consequences beyond those to his client, it introduces shades of gray
into the interpretation of a lawyer’s actions. What are the parameters which define the scope of
the lawyer’s gatekeeping role? Should the duty be found only in a general duty to work for the
betterment of the law on his own time as a lawyer-citizen, or does the duty extend to specific
19

Of course, under even an extreme view of the zealous advocacy role, an attorney’s actions are
not completely unfettered. For instance, no one would claim that an attorney should be ethically

client representations? If so, does it reach only client actions that are clearly accepted as illegal
under current law, or can it intrude into areas where reasonable minds might differ regarding the
legal outcome? At the extreme, must an attorney limit his involvement to situations where the
client’s position is the clearly accepted one under current law?
Even once the relevant scope is identified, what action must or may an attorney
take when weighing his client’s interests against adverse consequences to others? Is it sufficient
to merely bring the tension to the client’s attention? Or must he counsel against the client’s
action? If the latter, must the practitioner actually withdraw from the representation if his
counsel is ignored? Or does the obligation (especially if the harmed party would be the
Government) run even deeper, compelling him to affirmatively bring the recalcitrant client’s
actions to the attention of the injured party despite his general duty of client confidentiality?
Finally, to what extent should the gatekeeping function differ based on the legal context, both in
terms of the field of law involved and in terms of the type of advocacy being undertaken?
In the tax field the answer to these questions has typically been driven by
concerns about dissuading overly aggressive tax planning.20 So, there is little dispute regarding a
tax attorney’s obligation to deal truthfully with the Government when responding to inquiries

permitted to fabricate or destroy evidence, make false statements to a tribunal, or act to further an
ongoing crime. See e.g., Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.3.
20
Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Legitimacy and the Right of Revolution: The Role of Tax Protests and
Anti-Tax Rhetoric in America, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 819, 874 (2002) (“The difference between tax
avoidance and tax evasion is that the latter is illegal, while the former is just smart tax planning.
The boundary between the two is blurry.”); Holmes, supra note 13, at 187 (2010) (“the line
between legitimate tax planning . . . and overly aggressive or abusive reporting by taxpayers
continues to get pushed.”); Lavoie, supra note 11, at 49 (“The inherent tension between
legitimate tax planning and the creation of abusive tax shelters presents [a] line drawing exercise:
which transactions should the tax law dissuade and prohibit as abusive, and which transactions
should the tax law permit as attempts to work within the statutory framework toward the goal of
legitimate tax minimization?”).

about underlying facts21 and to advise his client against taking frivolous or patently improper tax
positions.22 Conversely, when a tax matter proceeds to actual litigation, the accepted view has
been that a tax lawyer’s obligations are the same as in any other type of litigation.23 The
questions become harder when a tax lawyer is consulted in the planning stages of a transaction,
where the legal questions presented rarely have clear cut answers. The role of the tax lawyer is
to sort through the extant authorities and utilize her experience and judgment in determining the
legal strength of a given tax position.24 The analysis is multifaceted, involving not just an

21

See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. section 10.20 (“A practitioner must, on a proper and lawful request by a
duly authorized officer or employee of the Internal Revenue Service, promptly submit records or
information in any matter before the Internal Revenue Service unless the practitioner believes in
good faith and on reasonable grounds that the records or information are privileged.”); 31 C.F.R.
section 10.51 (explicitly noting that a practitioner may be censured, suspended, or disbarred from
practice before the IRS for “[g]iving false or misleading information, or participating in any way
in the giving of false or misleading information to the Department of the Treasury or any officer
or employee thereof, or to any tribunal authorized to pass upon Federal tax matters, in
connection with any matter pending or likely to be pending before them, knowing the
information to be false or misleading.”). Of course ABA Model Rule 4.1 is also explicit that an
attorney shall not knowingly make a false statement of any material fact to any party in
representing a client. See also, ABA Formal Opinion 93-375 (Aug. 6, 1993) (an attorney
representing a client in the context of a governmental agency investigation “may not under any
circumstances lie to or mislead agency officials, either by affirmative misstatement or by
omitting a material fact necessary to assure that statements made are not false or misleading.”).
22
As discussed infra at Part III.A.1., even with its most liberal interpretation, the bar has
maintained that a tax return reporting position must have at least a “reasonable basis” for a
practitioner to advise in its favor. ABA Formal Opinion 314. While the “reasonable basis”
standard used in that opinion was interpreted by some as requiring only a “colorable basis” for a
position, the position still could not be completely frivolous. ABA Opinion 85-352 (explaining
the need for clarifying the standard announced in Opinion 314). Again, this also accords with
the acknowledged limits to the zealous advocacy norm generally. See Model Rules of Prof’l
Conduct R. 3.1 (“A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue
therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous”).
23
See Hatfield, supra note 8, at 52. Although, as noted earlier, in recent times commentators
have begun to question the extent to which a strong zealous advocacy standard is appropriate
even in pure litigation settings. See supra note 3.
24
Richard Lavoie, Analyzing the Schizoid Agency: Achieving the Proper Balance in Enforcing
the Internal Revenue Code, 23 AKRON TAX J. 1, 20 (2008); Frank J. Gould, Giving Tax Advice Some Ethical, Professional, and Legal Considerations, 97 TAX NOTES 523 (2002); Jasper L.
Cummings, Jr., The Range of Legal Tax Opinions, with Emphasis on the “Should” Opinion, 98

intimate understanding of the particular statutory and regulatory provisions involved, but a keen
appreciation for the policy considerations underlying the rules, the non-tax related business
motivations of the client, and the anticipated reaction of the judiciary if litigation ultimately
ensues. However, despite this grounding, the lawyer’s view of the advisability of a transaction
may often appear to a layman as simply a “smell test” akin to an “I know it when I see it”
obscenity-like standard.25 The key however, is that the grounding of the analysis should create a
commonality of approach that leads most practitioners to reach similar conclusions regarding the
appropriateness of any given transaction.26 So, as discussed in this article, the scope of tax
gatekeeping is primarily centered on this grey area of aggressive tax-motivated planning.
Within that scope, determining how strong a position needs to be before it can be
ethically advised has been a matter of debate over the years. Depending on the time period and
the context, the answer has changed dramatically.27 As discussed more fully in Part III below,
the Government’s return preparer penalty provisions now provide that, in essence,28 a tax advisor
needs a reasonable belief that an advised position more likely than not would be sustained if

TAX NOTES 1125 (2003); Detlev F. Vagts, Legal Opinions in Quantitative Terms: The Lawyer as
Haruspex or Bookie?, 34 BUS. LAW. 421 (1979).
25
Dana L. Trier, Beyond the Smell Test: The Role of Substantive Anti-Avoidance Rules in
Addressing the Corporate Tax Shelter Problem, 78 TAXES 62 (2000).
26
Richard Lavoie, Activist or Automaton: The Institutional need to Reach a Middle Ground in
American Jurisprudence, 68 ALBANY L. REV. 611, 625-6 (2005).
27
See Part III.A., infra for a discussion of how return position standards have evolved over time.
28
The statutory standard discussed here, section 6694, literally only applies to a person who
prepares at least a substantial portion of a tax return or claim for refund for compensation. 26
U.S.C. § 7701(a)(36)(A). However, the Treasury Department’s rules governing practice before
the Internal Revenue Service (“Circular 230,” codified at 31 C.F.R. Subtitle A, Part 10) are
significantly broader and provide that “a practitioner may not willfully, recklessly, or through
gross incompetence” advise a client to take a position on a tax return or claim for refund unless
the section 6694 certainty standards are met. 31 C.F.R. § 10.31(a)(1)(ii). Additionally, the
relevant penalty provisions applicable directly to taxpayers reflect substantially the same
certainty standards as well, and thus the advice that a practitioner will provide to a taxpayer

there is either (1) a significant purpose of a plan or arrangement to avoid or evade federal
income tax or (2) the transaction meets certain criteria causing it to qualify as a specifically
reportable transaction.29 If the underlying transaction does not have a significant tax avoidance
purpose, then an undisclosed position still must be supported by “substantial authority”30, and a
position that will be adequately disclosed by the taxpayer on his tax return must have a
“reasonable basis.”31 A tax return preparer that violates these guidelines is subject to penalty.32
Tax attorneys who do not meet the requirements of a return preparer may still find themselves in
violation of the Government’s rules for practice before the Internal Revenue Service.33 In any
event, an attorney violating these guidelines might be open to malpractice claims from his

about the certainty of a position will obviously be shaped in the context of instructing the
taxpayer regarding his own penalty exposure. 26 U.S.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B).
29
26 U.S.C. § 6694(a)(2)(C). Some commentators have advocated for adopting such a “more
likely than not” standard generally for all tax advice. See Brett Wells, Voluntary Compliance:
This Return Might Be Right But Probably Isn’t, 29 VA TAX REV. 645 (2010).
30
26 U.S.C. § 6694(a)(2)(A). The substantial authority standard is described in the relevant
regulations as falling between the reasonable basis standard and the more likely than not
standard. 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-4(d). While assigning mathematical probabilities to such standards
is fraught with peril, substantial authority has been pegged at roughly a 40 percent chance of
success on the merits. Burgess Raby & William Raby, “Reasonable Basis” v. Other Tax
Opinion Standards, 73 TAX NOTES 1209 (1996); Michael Doran, Tax Penalties and Tax
Compliance, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 111, 119 (2009); Linda M. Beale, Tax Advice Before The
Return: The Case For Raising Standards and Denying Evidentiary Privileges, 25 VA. TAX REV.
583, 594 (2006); J. Timothy Philipps, It’s Not Easy Being Easy: Advising Tax Return Positions,
50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 589, 606 (1993).
31
26 U.S.C. § 6694(a)(2)(B). Reasonable basis is defined in Treasury Regulation 1.6662-3 as “a
relatively high standard of tax reporting, that is, significantly higher than not frivolous or not
patently improper.” The regulations explain that it is not satisfied by a position that is “merely
colorable” or “merely arguable.” However, if the position is based on one of the authorities set
out in Treas. Reg. § 1.6662–4(d)(3)(iii) “(taking into account the relevance and persuasiveness of
the authorities, and subsequent developments), the return position will generally satisfy the
reasonable basis standard even though it may not satisfy the substantial authority standard.” Most
commentators peg the reasonable basis standard as indicating an approximately twenty percent
(20%) or greater chance of success on the merits. See authorities cited in supra note 30.
32
Section 6694 provides a penalty for tax return or refund claim equal to the greater of $1,000 or
50 percent of the income derived by the return preparer from the subject return or claim. 26
U.S.C. § 6694(a)(1).

client.34 As a result, if an attorney firmly believes a client’s intended tax reporting of a
transaction would violate these standards, it is unlikely that the attorney would continue to
represent the client.
Nevertheless, in many such cases the decision regarding whether the relevant
reporting standards would be violated will be a close one. In those situations, an attorney who
views his role as a zealous advocate (or more cynically, whose economic interests are tied to
allowing the client to proceed) might be more inclined to color her assessment of the transaction
in the client’s favor. This is where a strong gatekeeping ethical norm would encourage
practitioners to hew to a more conservative view of the issue and thereby dissuade more
questionable transactions at the margin. But, should tax attorneys undertake such a gatekeeping
function when doing so is arguably detrimental to their clients’ interests?
B.

Justifications for Tax Gatekeeping
A number of arguments have been made to support a gatekeeping role for the tax

attorneys. Some have argued that since taxes are used for the benefit of the society as a whole
and taxpayers have an interest in seeing that taxes are paid, the relationship between taxpayer
and government is not a truly adversarial one and therefore the zealous advocacy norms that
would apply to a normal civil adversary should not apply.35 Others have noted that tax

33

31 C.F.R. § 10.31(a)(1)(ii). See discussion at supra note 28.
Jay Soled, Tax Shelter Malpractice Cases and Their Implications For Tax Compliance, 58
AM. U.L. REV. 267, 269 (2008).
35
Hatfield, supra note 8, at 16. Of course, it can be easily responded that while this is true in the
abstract, once any particular tax dispute arises, the specific taxpayer involved will either pay
more or less depending on the outcome and therefore, at least in a controversy setting the
relationship between the taxpayer and the government is fully as adversarial as in any other
litigation.
34

practitioners are subject to direct regulation by the Government,36 and as such can be said to owe
duties to the Government due to this special relationship.37 A crasser justification is that
gatekeeping helps lawyers maintain their personal reputation vis a vis the Government and
therefore it is in their personal interest, as well as indirectly in the general interest of all their
current and future clients.38 However, the primary justification for a gatekeeping role in tax
practice arises from the very nature of our tax system.
The hallmark of the U.S. income tax system is its self-assessment nature.39 That
is, taxpayers determine how the tax law applies to their particular situation and then calculate and
pay their tax liability accordingly.40 This puts the initial burden on taxpayers to apply the law
36

The Secretary of the Treasury has authority to regulate the conduct of, and to discipline,
practitioners appearing before it. 31 U.S.C. § 330. Pursuant to this authority, Circular 230,
codified at 31 C.F.R. Subtitle A, Part 10, sets forth detailed rules governing practice before the
Internal Revenue Service and establishes a Director of the Office of Professional Responsibility
to implement them and monitor practitioner compliance.
37
Hatfield, supra note 8, at 18. Of course, Circular 230 technically only governs practice before
the Internal Revenue Service. Consequently, prior to 2004, it was sometimes argued that
practitioners providing tax planning advice were not covered by these rules since practice before
the Internal Revenue Service only covered audit defense, tax controversy work and other direct
dealings with Internal Revenue Service personnel. See, e.g., Ben Wang, NOTE: Supplying The
Tax Shelter Industry: Contingent Fee Compensation For Accountants Spurs Production, 76 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1237, 1266 (2003). Therefore any gatekeeping obligation arising from Circular
230 would be limited to those controversy related contexts. To address this issue Congress
amended 31 U.S.C. § 330 in 2004 to add subsection (d) to explicitly bring “written advice with
respect to any entity, transaction plan or arrangement, or other plan or arrangement, which is of a
type which the Secretary determines as having a potential for tax avoidance or evasion” within
the ambit of Circular 230. Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 822(b), 118 Stat. 1418, 1587 (2004).
Additionally, in 2005 Circular 230 was amended to provide “aspirational” best practices for
practitioners providing tax advice generally. 31 C.F.R. 10.33.
38
Hatfield, supra note 8, at 27-28.
39
See, e.g., Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 176 (1957) (“Our system of taxation is based
upon voluntary assessment and payment, not upon distraint.”); Joseph J. Darby, Confidentiality
and the Law of Taxation, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 577, 577 (1998) (“The United States enjoys what is
quite probably the most successful tax collection system in the world. It is based on the principle
of voluntary self-assessment.”).
40
Doran, supra note 30, at 113; Richard Lavoie, Subverting the Rule of Law: The Judiciary’s
Role in Fostering Unethical Behavior, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 115, 176 (2004).

correctly to their personal situation. Indeed, in filing their tax returns taxpayers must affirm
under penalties of perjury their belief that the return is “true, correct and complete.”41 Of course,
our tax laws are complex and understanding them in concept, let alone how they apply and
interrelate in a given fact pattern, is often unclear. Consequently, taxpayers look to, and the
efficient functioning of the tax system relies on, the advice of tax practitioners to guide them as
to the most appropriate interpretation of the law. Note that the taxpayer’s has the legal duty to
report his correct tax based on his facts and the relevant law.42 Consequently, this goal, reporting
the correct tax, also should be the guiding principle for the tax adviser.43
However, the gatekeeping responsibility of the tax lawyer is not just premised on
helping the client meet the legal obligation of arriving at the correct tax, but is also premised on
the Government’s inability to adequately double check each taxpayer’s initial tax determination.
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See, e.g., IRS, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, Form 1040 (2011), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1040.pdf; IRS, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, Form 1120 (2011),
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substantiating claimed deductions upon the taxpayer.”). Of course, reasonable minds might
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‘True And Correct:’ Standards For Tax Return Reporting, 43 TAX NOTES 1521 (1989); Beale,
supra note 30, at 594.
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Myron C. Grauer, What’s Wrong with This Picture?: The Tension Between Analytical
Premises and Appropriate Standards for Tax Practitioners, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 353, 358 (1991)
(practitioner’s duties derive from taxpayer’s duty to file true and correct tax return); Gwen
Thayer Handelman, Reply, Counseling Ordered Liberty, 9 VA. TAX REV. 781, 781-86 (1990)
(practitioner’s reporting position obligations derivative of the client’s duties to comply with the
tax laws).

Each year the Government can audit only a small fraction of all taxpayer returns.44 If taxpayers
routinely report their taxes based on the most aggressive interpretation of the law, instead of
based on an even-handed one, then the fisc will be harmed. Further, as the magnitude of such
aggressive reporting increases, it breeds disrespect for the law and encourages others to push the
envelope as well.45 This would be a weight our tax system could not bear.
Further, when tax practitioners are involved in planning transactions, or assisting
taxpayers in developing their reporting positions for a completed transaction, one can question
whether such work is truly adversarial, as that term has been traditionally interpreted. Our
adversarial system of justice contemplates a competition among equals that is intended to
efficiently and fairly yield the “truth.”46 Thus, having a taxpayer make colorable arguments
regarding his proper tax burden is justifiable once the issue has been joined with the Government
(either administratively or in litigation), but making those identical claims on an initial tax return,
when no adversary has yet entered the ring, impedes the arrival at a fair result.
As one commentator put it, the “fundamental role of tax practitioners [is] to
identify for taxpayers those tax return positions that may be attempted and those that are beyond
the pale. . . . In a real sense, the tax adviser is a gatekeeper who regulates the flow of issues into
the system. . . . For self-assessment to be workable, tax advisers cannot fail to perform their
gatekeeper function and cannot allow a floodtide of illegitimate issues to swamp the system.
Accordingly, it is imperative that tax advisers apply professional standards with intellectual
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46
Edward Barrett, The Adversary System and the Ethics of Advocacy, 37 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
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honesty in determining what positions have enough credibility to be able to be asserted.”47 Of
course, determining exactly how weak a position must be to trigger this gatekeeper intervention
is a highly relevant question that has been the subject of much debate, but defining the relevant
threshold is intellectually distinct from the question of whether there is a gatekeeping obligation
at all.
C.

Arguments Against Tax Gatekeeping
While the existence of a tax gatekeeping obligation has traditionally been

acknowledged by many in the tax bar,48 there has always been a segment of the bar that rejected
this proposition,49 including some very well-known tax lawyers.50 While there are variations of
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supra note 9, at 2005 (1982); Anthony Infanti, Eyes Wide Shut: Surveying Erosion in the
Professionalism of the Tax Bar, 22 VA. TAX REV. 589, 606 (2003); David M. Schizer, Enlisting
the Tax Bar, 59 TAX L. REV. 331, 338 (2007); John M. Maguire, Conscience and Propriety in
Lawyer’s Tax Practice, 13 TAX L. REV. 27, 36 (1957); Francis C. Oatway, Motivation and
Responsibility in Tax Practice: The Need for Definition, 20 TAX L. REV. 237, 254 (1965);
Thomas N. Tarleau, Ethical Problems in Dealing with Treasury Representatives, 8 TAX L. REV.
10, 11 (1952); Mortimer M. Caplin, Responsibilities of the Tax Advisor - A Perspective, 40
TAXES 1030, 1032 (1962); Frederic G. Corneel, Guidelines to Tax Practice Second, 43 TAX
LAW. 297, 301-02 (1990); Michael C. Durst, The Tax Lawyer’s Professional Responsibility, 39
U. Fla. L. Rev. 1027, 1028, 1031 n.9, 1050 n.81 (1987); Linda Galler, The Tax Lawyer’s Duty to
the System, 16 VA. TAX REV. 681, 687-98 (1997); Loren D. Prescott, Jr., Challenging the
Adversarial Approach to Taxpayer Representation, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 693, 715 (1997);
Randolph W. Thrower, Preserving the Integrity of the Federal Tax System, 33 N.Y.U. INST. ON
FED. TAX’N 707, 709-10 (1975); Johnnie M. Walters, Ethical and Professional Responsibilities
of Tax Practitioners, 17 GONZ. L. REV. 23 (1981); Ann Southworth, Note, Redefining the
Attorney’s Role in Abusive Tax Shelters, 37 STAN. L. REV. 889, 891, 908-12, 918 (1985).
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LAW. 169, 190 (2009); Camilla E. Watson, Tax Lawyers, Ethical Obligations, and the Duty to
the System, 47 KAN. L. REV. 847, 851, 871, 909 (1999); Camilla Watson, Legislating Morality:
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degree, the primary argument against a gatekeeping role for tax attorneys grounded itself in the
zealous advocacy norm. At the extreme, some expressed libertarian fears of the government
acting as “Big Brother” through attorneys being required to report on their own clients.51 For
others the rejection of any gatekeeping role arose from blind allegiance to the concept that the
role of a lawyer is purely to serve his client’s interests without any moral judgment.52
Others viewed any weakening of a strong zealous advocacy norm as holding out
the prospect of creating intolerable conflicts of interest between attorneys and their clients due to
the attorney’s competing obligation to the Government.53 A more nuanced version of this claim
was that a client’s knowledge of his attorney’s dual obligations would make the client less
forthcoming with underlying facts and motivations, with the result that the lawyer’s legal advice
would be skewed, or cause clients to not seek legal advice at all.54 Viewed in this light,
weakening the zealous advocacy norm, even in a planning context, in fact undermines the
bedrock taxpayer compliance required for the self-assessment system to function.55 Intriguingly
this argument contains an internal contradiction. The argument maintains that a gatekeeping role
will dissuade taxpayers from seeking legal advice (or hiding the true facts when seeking advice)
and as a result taxpayers will take unjustified positions. The implication is that, in the absence of
a gatekeeping obligation, taxpayers would get full unfettered pro-taxpayer advice and yet the

1970); Randolph E. Paul, The Lawyer as a Tax Advisor, 25 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 412, 429
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1994, LEXIS 94 TNT 135-46 (“I will do everything that I can to be absolutely certain that my
clients do not pay one dime more tax than is absolutely required! That is what I was trained to do
and that is what my clients pay me to do. To accuse me or anyone else in the tax community of
not “playing fair” and to demand that I somehow overlook planning ideas in the name of morals
is, in the words of Judge Learned Hand, ‘mere cant.’”)
53
Moraine, supra note 49.
54
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taxpayers would take fewer unjustified positions. Why would that be the case unless the
presence of the attorney in fact did dissuade unwarranted taxpayer positions, implicitly
recognizing that the attorneys must be performing at least some gatekeeping despite their
purported zealous advocacy?
The interesting commonality between the traditional arguments for and against a
gatekeeper role is that both sets of arguments largely devolve into a debate about the scope of the
zealous advocacy norm and its appropriateness outside of a litigation or controversy context.
Those resisting a special gatekeeping obligation for tax practitioners often grounded their
opposition in part on the premise that the ethical obligations of attorneys should be the same
regardless of their field.56 As discussed earlier, this article, and the recent evolution in legal
ethics generally, favor the contrary position; that it is appropriate to modify the zealous advocacy
norm in non-adversarial contexts. So, the traditional arguments against a specific tax
gatekeeping duty are weaker today than was true historically since the perception of the lawyer’s
role in non-adversarial contexts generally has undergone a transformation.
D.

The Practical Approach
Beyond those actively arguing whether tax lawyers had a gatekeeping duty, a

third segment of the tax bar historically took the position that the entire question was merely a
matter of academic interest.57 That is, the general obligation of taxpayers to file a correct return
and other specific Government rules regarding factual disclosures by taxpayers and their
representatives were sufficient to ensure taxpayer compliance with the self-assessment system
without any need to imply any additional specific duty on tax practitioners. Further, it was
55
56

Id.
Hatfield, supra note 8, at 22-24.

argued that as a matter of practical lawyering, most tax advisors would counsel their clients to
act prudently in any event whether or not any specific gatekeeping obligation actually existed.
As one commentator stated:
[Y]ou are never really up against the gun to determine whether the practitioner
does have dual responsibilities [to his client and to his government], but that it is
just good business for you, for the client and for the government to try to
minimize adversary aspects just as much as possible, and to increase the
disclosure aspects just as much as possible, and thereby to improve relationships
among the three of you as much as possible. . . . [It is a] mere academic exercise
when we discuss the degree to which there is this dual relationship . . . [but] it is
in our best interest to act as if there were a dual responsibility. 58
Thus, as a practical matter, through the mid-1960s, many tax attorneys implicitly exercised a
gatekeeping function, irrespective of whether they acknowledged an actual ethical obligation to
do so.
III.

The Decline of Tax Gatekeeping
A.

The Rise of Lawyer Facilitated Tax Shelter Activity
The prevailing gatekeeping norm in the tax bar began to noticeably weaken with

the wave of tax shelters focused on individual taxpayers that swept the country in the 1970s and
then dissipated further with the wave of corporate tax shelters that occurred in the 1990s. Both
periods were characterized by the use of legal opinions to bless highly aggressive tax avoidance
transactions. In both situations, the tax bar was unable, or unwilling, to stem the tax shelter tide
and that failure resulted in increased regulation of tax opinion practice by the Government as
well as changes to the statutory penalty provisions applicable to taxpayers. These tax shelter
waves provide stark evidence of the abdication of their traditional gatekeeping function by a
significant portion of the tax bar.

57

Id. at 27-8.

1.

The Tax Shelters of the 1970s

Up through 1965 then, the prevailing (although by no means monolithic) position
of the tax bar, as evidenced by the commentary of the time and actual prudent practice, was to
endorse a gatekeeping function.59 In 1965 the American Bar Association Ethics Committee, in
Formal Opinion 314 (the “1965 Opinion”), seriously challenged this prevailing ethical norm.60
The 1965 Opinion took the position that since disputes with the Government regarding a
taxpayer’s tax liability were adversarial, and the taxpayer’s filing of a tax return was the first step
in any ultimate dispute, a lawyer ethically should resolve doubts in favor of the client in prereturn tax planning.61 Further, the 1965 Opinion refused to treat the Government as a “tribunal”
to which a higher duty of disclosure would be required. The bottom line assessment in the 1965
Opinion was that a lawyer could ethically advise a client to take any position without any
highlighting disclosure as long as there was a “reasonable basis” for the position.62 In reaching
its conclusion, the 1965 Opinion completely ignored the reality of the self-assessment system
and the taxpayer’s legal obligation to report their correct tax liability. Given the low
Government audit rate, a lawyer’s advice to take an extreme tax return position without specific
disclosure to the Government would most often result in a de facto final determination that the
position was correct, rather than merely indicating that the position would not be considered
fraudulent or frivolous by a court in an ultimate litigation.63 However, despite its logical flaws,
58
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the 1965 Opinion was in line with the popular conception of the tax law,64 including by the
courts,65 to think of tax law interpretation as a completely objective economic calculus imbued
with no moral, ethical or societal considerations.66 Similarly, the pro-taxpayer stance in the 1965
Opinion coincided with a decrease in certain broader societal norms which had acted as a
counterbalance to this amoral approach to taxpaying obligations.67
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The reasonable basis standard set forth in the 1965 Opinion became the accepted
standard used by tax practitioners in providing tax return advice for the next 20 years.68 During
this period there was an explosion of tax shelter activity.69 These tax shelters typically involved
creating investment vehicles where investors were promised large tax benefits in connection with
their investments.70 Typically, the claimed tax benefits for the investments were justified based
on tax opinions provided by tax lawyers involved in developing the underlying investment
transaction.71 Unfortunately for all involved, these opinions typically did not forthrightly address
the relevant law, were based on incorrect factual assumptions, or failed to actually state the
likelihood of success if the transaction were questioned by the Government.72 While the number
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the government was a vital component in the effort to defeat the communist threat to capitalism.
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correspondingly weakened.
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of tax attorneys actually involved in drafting such opinions and promoting these tax shelters was
relatively small, the broader tax bar failed to effectively dissuade their colleagues from engaging
in this activity and failed to dissuade the public from engaging in these aggressive transactions.73
As a result of the failure of the tax bar to effectively curtail the creation and use of
these tax shelter opinions, the Government was forced to intervene more directly. In the early
1980s the Government proposed, and ultimately adopted in modified form, specific provisions in
Circular 230 regulating the content of tax opinions used in these tax shelter transactions,74
enacted various tax penalty provisions,75 enacted increased disclosure, reporting and procedural
requirements,76 and passed numerous substantive changes to the tax law77 all aimed at addressing
aspects of the tax shelter problem. Similarly, the courts were active in the fight against such tax
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proposed amendments to Circular 230 to directly regulate practitioner behavior which the bar felt
were overly strict. See Tax Shelters; Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 45 Fed. Reg.
58,594 (1980) (proposed Aug. 29, 1980); Holden, supra note 71, at 217-18.
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While the Government’s initially proposed amendments to Circular 230 were viewed by many
practitioners as too strict, the changes ultimately adopted ended up instead as essentially
codifying the core ethical standards the bar had adopted in Formal Opinion 346. Id. at 222-24.
See Amendments to Circular 230, 49 Fed. Reg. 6719 (1984).
75
See e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 6659 (valuation overstatement penalty); 26 U.S.C. § 6661 (the substantial
understatement penalty); 26 U.S.C. § 6700 (penalty for promoting abusive tax shelters); 26
U.S.C. §§ 6707, 6708 (penalty for failing to furnish information regarding tax shelters).
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See e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 6045(e) (real estate transaction reporting); 26 U.S.C. § 6111 (promoter
registration of tax shelters); 26 U.S.C. § 6112 (maintenance of investor lists by organizers and
sellers of tax shelters); 26 U.S.C. §§ 6221-6231 (partnership audit rules); 26 U.S.C. § 7408
(injunctive action against promoters of abusive tax shelters).

shelter activity.78 While this type of tax shelter activity dissipated in the years following these
changes, their contribution to that result is unclear since it appears that an unrelated statutory
change, the adoption of the passive activity loss rules in 1986,79 was the primary factor in the
demise of this particular type of tax shelter activity.80
2.

The Tax Shelters of the 1990s

Contemporaneously with the widespread tax shelter activity in the 1970s and
early 1980s, there was a marked decline in practitioner adherence to the reasonable basis tax
reporting standard that the ABA had put forth in the 1965 Opinion.81 As a result, the ABA
decided to revisit the question of the proper tax reporting certitude standard and as a result
adopted Formal Opinion 85-352 of the ABA’s Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility (the “1985 Opinion”).82 The 1985 Opinion restated the relevant ethical standard
for an attorney to counsel a tax return position as one that had “some realistic possibility” of
success if litigated.83 While this standard was somewhat higher than the former reasonable basis
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See, e.g., Estate of Franklin v. Comm’r, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976); Frank Lyon Co. v.
U.S., 435 U.S. 561 (1978); Hilton v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 305 (1980), aff’d per curiam, 671 F.2d
316 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 907 (1982); Comm’r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983);
Odend’hal v. Comm’r, 748 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1984); Rice’s Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm’r, 752
F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1985).
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26 U.S.C. § 469.
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See, Yin, supra note 69, at 218-20 and sources cited therein; Christine Rucinski Strong &
Susan Pace Hamill, Allocations Attributable to Partner Nonrecourse Liabilities: Issues Revealed
by LLCs and LLPs, 51 ALA. L. REV. 603, 607 (2000).
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Holden, supra note 71, at 235.
82
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985), reprinted
in 39 TAX LAW. 631, 631 (1986).
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Id. Since most tax advice and tax opinion work by practitioners would not fall within the
specific strictures of the syndicated tax shelter rules then embodied in Formal Opinion 346 and
Circular 230, the “realistic possibility” certitude level set forth in the 1985 Opinion became the
primary ethical consideration for practitioners following its adoption. David Weisbach and

benchmark, its underlying premise was essentially the same as that of the 1965 Opinion. Both
opinions considered filing tax returns to be aspects of the adversarial process and gave no serious
consideration to the very different context between an actually joined adversarial proceeding and
the mere filing of a tax return, especially in light of the necessarily low Government audit rate
and the intended functioning of the self-assessment system.84 Thus, the relevant ethical
guideline applicable to tax practitioners in planning situations was only marginally higher in the
post-1985 period than it had been previously.85
Similarly, while the 1980s heralded some changes in the civil penalties faced by
taxpayers, the basic penalty structure remained one that left significant room for taxpayers and
their legal advisors to undertake aggressive tax motivated transactions. In rendering planning
advice in the early 1990s, a tax lawyer primarily needed to consider only whether the proposed
transaction would expose the client to either a negligence penalty86 or a substantial
understatement penalty.87 As a general matter, a taxpayer could avoid both of these penalties if
he obtained and relied in good faith on an opinion of counsel supporting the claimed position.88

Brian Gale, The Regulation of Tax Advice and Advisers, 130TAX NOTES 1279, 1285 (Mar. 14,
2011). Phrased in terms of percentages, a realistic possibility of success was considered to
represent a 33% chance of success on the merits. See authorities cited in supra note 30.
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Durst, supra note 48, at 1047.
85
Dennis Ventry, Jr., Cooperative Tax Regulation, 41 CONN. L. REV. 431, 470 (2008); Soled,
supra note 34, at 291; Beale, supra note 30, at 628-29.
86
Former 26 U.S.C. § 6662(b)(1) and former 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-3. The negligence penalty was
inapplicable as long as a reasonable basis existed for the taxpayer’s position (or a realistic
possibility of success existed if the position was directly contrary to certain published
authorities).
87
Former 26 U.S.C. § 6662(b)(2) and former 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-4. The substantial
understatement penalty became applicable once an underpayment surpassed a threshold level,
but, as discussed below, could be avoided if (provided a tax shelter transaction was not involved)
the taxpayer had “substantial authority” for his reporting position or if the position was
adequately disclosed.
88
This was true both due to the operation of the specific penalty provisions and due to an
overarching “reasonable cause” exception under then section 6664. That section provided that

If the underlying transaction giving rise to the claimed tax benefit was one in which “the”
principal purpose was the evasion or avoidance of tax, a “tax shelter” under the statute,89 then the
opinion as a practical matter needed to find that the position was more likely than not correct.90
However, since a tax shelter for purposes of the substantial understatement penalty only existed
when the tax motive exceeded that of any other motive, transactions with business or profit
making purposes would generally not be covered by this more likely than not standard. In those
cases, a taxpayer avoided any penalty for taking the position as long as “substantial authority”
existed for the position.91 In non-tax shelter situations where substantial authority was ultimately
found lacking, the taxpayer could often escape penalty due to reliance on a tax opinion finding
that substantial authority existed.
Thus at the start of the 1990s a tax practitioner could ethically counsel in favor of
taking any position for which there was a realistic possibility of success, although in some cases
the adviser would also have to alert the client to the need for disclosure of the position to
eliminate the risk of penalties. Further, by supplying the client with a tax opinion at a substantial
authority level, or in tax shelter situations at a more likely than not level, the tax practitioner

no penalty would be applied to a taxpayer that was found, based on all the facts and
circumstances, to have made a good faith effort to determine his proper tax liability (which could
be shown by reasonable reliance on an opinion of counsel).
89
Former 26 U.S.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C); former 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-4(g)(2).
90
Technically, to avoid the penalty if a tax shelter was involved, the taxpayer need to show (1)
that “substantial authority” existed for the position and (2) that the taxpayer had a reasonable
belief that the position taken was “more likely than not” correct. Id. A taxpayer’s reasonable
belief could be premised on a tax opinion stating a more likely than not conclusion. Id.
91
If no tax shelter were involved, then the substantial underpayment penalty would be
inapplicable as long as either (1) substantial authority existed for the position or (2) the position
was non-frivolous and it was adequately disclosed on the tax return. Former 26 U.S.C. §
6662(b)(2) and former 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-4. While a tax opinion concluding that substantial
authority existed obviously would not be conclusive regarding whether substantial authority
actually did exist, the taxpayer’s reasonable reliance on such an opinion would generally allow

could effectively insulate the client from potential civil penalties for taking the position. This
was the ethical and statutory backdrop for the wave of tax shelter activity that occurred in the
1990s and early 2000s.
Unlike the prior era of tax shelters, which focused on syndicating tax loss
transactions to individual taxpayers based largely on abusing the non-recourse debt rules, the
new wave of tax shelters were developed to exploit a wide variety of vagaries in the tax law and
then confidentially marketed to corporations and wealthy individuals as tax savings templates
that could be readily adapted to the particular client’s situation.92 The two periods were similar
though in the fact that aggressive tax opinions and advisors played a central role in both creating
and failing to impede these aggressive transactions. Again, in the face of the bar’s unwillingness
or inability to regulate its own behavior, the Government was forced to intercede with specific
rules regulating the furnishing of tax planning advice and significant changes to the civil penalty
provisions applicable to taxpayers.
In terms of the regulation of tax advice, the Government significantly expanded
the rules in Circular 230 regarding written tax advice well beyond the narrow rules applicable to
the syndication tax opinions of concern in the 1970s and 1980s. Today Circular 230 contains
detailed guidelines governing a wide variety of written advice provided in tax planning
situations.93 These rules were specifically intended to “send a strong message to tax

him to escape a penalty under the good faith exception of section 6664 even if the tax opinion
turned out to be incorrect.
92
See generally, Lavoie, supra note , at 49-50; Joseph Bankman, The New Market in Corporate
Tax Shelters, 83 TAX NOTES 1775, 1777 (June 21, 1999); OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF
TREASURY, TREASURY WHITE PAPER ON CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS, TAX NOTES TODAY, July 2,
1999, LEXIS 1999 TNT 127-12, 127-13.
93
31 C.F.R. §§ 10.35, 10.36 and 10.37. The main rules related to “covered opinions.” A
covered opinion is defined as any written advice regarding (1) any transaction that is the same or

professionals considering selling a questionable product to clients” and to “rein in practitioners
who disregard their ethical obligations.”94 Generally, the core requirements of these new rules
for covered opinions are that tax advisors must be more vigilant in their factual inquiries,
forthrightly deal with all the legal issues,95 and explicitly reach a conclusion that the proposed
tax treatment of an issue is at least more likely than not correct or, if there is only a lesser
confidence level, explicitly disclose that the taxpayer cannot rely on the opinion for penalty
protection purposes on that issue.96
In tandem with its direct regulation of practitioners’ written tax advice, the
Government also made numerous changes in the relevant civil penalty provisions applicable to
taxpayers. In general, these changes were aimed at making it more difficult for taxpayers to
avoid penalties.97 This was accomplished by increasing the certainty levels required to avoid the
penalties, as well as by making it more difficult to use reliance on a tax opinion as a basis for

substantially similar to abusive transactions specifically identified by the Government in
published guidance (“listed transactions”), (2) any plan or arrangement where “the” principal
purpose is tax avoidance or evasion, and most importantly (3) any plan or arrangement where “a
significant” purpose is tax avoidance or evasion if the opinion (a) expresses at least a more likely
than not assessment on any issue in favor of the taxpayer (a “reliance opinion”), (b) is one the
advisor knows, or has reason to know, will be used by the client or others to promote or market a
transaction to taxpayers (a “marketed opinion”), or (c) is issued in conjunction with the adviser
(i) agreeing to refund a portion of his fees if the taxpayer’s reporting position is not sustained or
(ii) imposing a confidentiality requirement on the client. Written advice not qualifying as a
covered opinion is more lightly regulated under section 10.37.
94
IR-2004-152 (Dec. 17, 2004), 2004 IRB LEXIS 521, also avail at
http://www.irs.gov/irs/article/0,,id=132445,00.html. (quoting then IRS Commissioner Mark W.
Everson).
95
“Significant purpose” transactions can be limited to an examination of only certain issues, but
market, listed and principal purpose opinion must deal with all relevant tax issues.
96
For a more detailed review and explanation of the current Circular 230 rules on written tax
advice, see David T. Moldenhauer, Circular 230 Opinion Standards, Legal Ethics and First
Amendment Limitations on the Regulation of Professional Speech by Lawyers, 29 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 843, 850-67 (2006); Weisbach and Gale, supra note 83, at 1285-87.
97
Id. at 1288.

exception from a penalty.98 For instance, while the baseline requirement today for avoiding a
substantial understatement penalty on non-tax shelter positions remains a substantial authority
confidence level, the definition of tax shelter has been significantly expanded to include any plan
or arrangement with a significant tax avoidance or evasion purpose.99 If a substantial
understatement of tax relates to such a tax shelter, then the penalty applies, despite the existence
of substantial authority, unless the taxpayer can satisfy the general reasonable cause exception of
section 6664.100 However, the relevant regulations under section 6664 have not been updated to
provide guidance regarding how the reasonable cause standard is to be applied to
understatements on individual tax returns following the various amendments to section 6662, so
some uncertainty exists regarding the exact circumstances under which reasonable cause
exception is still available.101
Finally, as in the 1980s, the government and the courts also moved to strike at the
underlying nature of the tax schemes. In the 1980s this was accomplished through a wide variety
of Governmental actions and court decisions.102 In the combating the more recent wave of tax
shelters it took the form, among other things, of creating a new tax return schedule requiring
certain corporations to specifically disclose uncertain tax positions,103 codifying the economic
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Additionally, if the transaction is found to lack economic substance (within the meaning of 26
U.S.C. § 7701(o)) then the reasonable cause exception under section 6664 becomes inapplicable.
Further, for certain reportable transactions incurring penalties under section 6662A, the
requirements under section 6664 for showing reasonable cause are heightened. 26 U.S.C. §
6664(d).
101
31 C.F.R. § 1.6664-4.
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See supra notes 75-79.
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Form 1120 Schedule UTP, available at, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1120utp.pdf.
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substance doctrine (a judicial doctrine whose operation was previously subject to debate),104 and
courts utilizing common law anti-abuse concepts to strike down aggressive transactions.105
Following these Government and judicial actions the latest wave of tax shelter
activity seems to have subsided.106 However, while insufficient gatekeeping by the tax bar
clearly contributed to the growth of such shelters, it is impossible to quantify the impact of the
Government’s increased direct regulation of tax practitioners in the subsiding of these tax
shelters.
B.

Factors Contributing to Weakened Gatekeeping
The foregoing discussion has demonstrated that while a gatekeeping function was

historically an ethical norm that the tax bar largely adhered to (at least in practice, even if not
specifically acknowledged), that norm has been increasingly rejected by practitioners over recent
decades. It may be tempting to some to ascribe the tax shelter activity in modern times to the
work of individual bad apples, or to bemoan the lack of individual moral character among
modern day attorneys.107 But this explanation misses the fact that it is not the intrinsic nature of
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See ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998); ASA Investerings P’ship v.
Comm’r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 325 (1998), aff’d, 201 F.3d 505 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Black & Decker,
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459 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2006); Jade Trading, LLC v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 487 (2005); Long
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Simon, supra note 9, at 1072; Andrea Monroe, What’s in a Name: Can the Partnership AntiAbuse Rule Really Stop Partnership Tax Abuse?, 60 CASE W. RES. 401, 461 (2010); Calvin H.
Johnson & Lawrence Zelenak, Codification of General Disallowance of Artificial Losses, 122
TAX NOTES 1389, 1391 (2009)
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Roger Colinvaux, Charity in the 21st Century: Trending Toward Decay, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 1,
19 (2011); Morse, supra note 14, at 988; Joseph Bankman, Tax Enforcement: Tax Shelters, The
Cash Economy, and Compliance Costs, 31 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 1, 9 (2005). However, the
widespread nature of the tax shelter market in the 1990s and early 2000s belie the plausibility of
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the individuals involved that has changed. Individuals will always act in their own self interest
unless constrained by legal or societal constraints.108 Yet despite the immutability of
humankind, ethical norms do not remain static. What is currently ethically acceptable is
primarily a function of the prevailing moral framework accepted by a society, as adapted to the
context of the particular subgroup to which the ethical norm is applicable.109 So, the question is
not why individual practitioners today are “less” ethical than their predecessors, but rather, why
does the tax bar no longer view a gatekeeping function as the appropriate ethical norm?
While numerous factors and changes over the recent decades have undoubtedly
contributed to the shift in the ethical reality of tax practice, four overarching areas of change can
be easily identified as highly significant in altering the ethical perceptions of the tax bar: (1)
evolving client norms for ethical behavior, (2) increasing competitive pressures on legal service
providers, (3) changing judicial approaches to statutory interpretation, and (4) a lessening
imperative favoring taxpaying in society as a whole.
1.

Client Norms for Ethical Behavior

One of the key factors supporting the existence of a gatekeeping norm was the
belief that by steering a client away from overly aggressive transactions the tax lawyer was in
fact acting in the client’s best interest. Implicit in this position was the assumption that the client
agreed that (1) a taxpayer has a duty to forthrightly pay its allocable portion of the nation’s tax
liability and that (2) the economic and public relations costs associated with defending
questionable tax transactions outweighed the benefits from engaging in such transactions. While

merely ascribing the activity to “bad apple” taxpayers and tax practitioners. Lavoie, supra note
40, at 186.
108
See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 91 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge
University Press 1991) (1651).

this was the accepted perception in the 1950s, matters have changed drastically since then.110
While in the past business ethics were substantially co-extensive with the prevailing morality of
society, today there exists a schism where a business person will think nothing of undertaking an
action on behalf of his business that would not be condoned as a matter of personal behavior.111
This creation of a separate business ethical culture has been driven by the idea that the focus of a
corporation is properly only the creation of profits for the owners of the business.112 As a result,
while businesses may highlight their socially responsible actions as a public relations and
marketing matter, shareholder profits remain king.113 In such an environment, moral and ethical
considerations are perceived as at most window dressing and therefore they have no power to
curb behavior harmful to society. As a result, the key constraints on any economically justified
business behavior are almost exclusively those actually imposed by law. 114 But how are even
these legal constraints to be applied? From a purely competitive vantage point, the goal of
109
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sample of such companies, it was found for instance that their donations to charity account for
less than 1 percent of their pretax profits. To such companies, CSR may have benefits from the
public relations standpoint, but that is about all.”). Proponents of corporate social responsibility
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bottom line. See, e.g., M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and the
Market for Altruism, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 571, 581 (2009). However, many argue that in
practice CSR efforts are merely co-opted by businesses for public relations and marketing
purposes. Michael B. Runnels, Elizabeth J. Kennedy, and Timothy B. Brown, Corporate Social
Responsibility and the New Governance: In Search Of Epstein’s Good Company In The
Employment Context, 43 AKRON L. REV. 501, 532 (2010); Edwin M. Epstein, The Good
Company: Rhetoric or Reality? Corporate Social Responsibility and Business Ethics Redux, 44
AM. BUS. L.J. 27, 212 (2007).
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business is to minimize the impact of any legal constraints that do exist. Hence, the direction
from clients to their lawyers is clear, interpret the law as narrowly as possible and without
reference to moral or ethical considerations. The focus on the bottom line within the business
world contributes to the perception that legal advisors serve merely as hired guns to further the
goals of the client.115 The function of lawyers, while more than mere scriveners, became merely
implementing exogenously determined business goals, rather than being active participants in
helping to shape, channel, modify, or heaven forbid, question those announced goals. In the face
of such clear client driven directives to achieve legal conclusions consonant with the business
bottom line, it became very difficult, if not impossible, for an attorney to justify a gatekeeping
role as being in line with their client’s perceived best interests.
2.

Legal Services Norms

As the prevailing business culture began to devalue the lawyer’s role as a
counselor, lawyers themselves began to devalue that role.116 This trend found a traditional
antecedent in the historical place of zealous advocacy in litigation. Further, just as clients were
succumbing to competitive pressures to focus solely on their bottom line profit, competitive
pressures were building in the legal marketplace. Where legal services had traditionally been
provided by lawyers practicing in law firm settings, there was a move to pull more legal talent in
house at businesses.117 This not only gave those in-house lawyers a more myopic view of their
role in serving the client, but also provided businesses with sophisticated in-house legal
114
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capabilities. This served both to decrease the revenue flowing to law firms by taking away many
run of the mill legal questions and tasks, but also provided clients with the ability to second
guess legal advice and take a more active role in shaping the legal advice ultimately provided by
their outside counsel.118
Finally, lawyers began facing competition from accountants and consulting
groups that began hiring lawyers to provide expanded advice to their clients.119 While non-law
advisors could not draft operative documents without running into issues regarding the
unauthorized practice of law, they could provide sophisticated tax planning advice tailored to
their client’s desires. This was further exacerbated by the international operations of many
businesses and the integration of legal and accounting functions in many international
jurisdictions.120 Thus, tax lawyers were faced not just with competition from other law firms, but
with competition from in-house legal functions and non-legal service providers. This coupled
with clients who were both less loyal to their historical outside legal counsel121 and more willing
to take their business to the provider who would sanction their preferred interpretation of the law,
inevitably led to a race to the bottom in legal services, where transactions were judged using the
lowest common denominator of technical compliance with the literal terms of the law.122
3.
117
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A related factor in attorney perceptions regarding the appropriateness of a tax
gatekeeping role derived from the judiciary’s attitude toward tax avoidance and statutory
interpretation.123 This factor is particularly significant since it directly contributes to the
dynamic encouraging the previously discussed factors. Historically the judiciary took a nonliteral approach to interpreting tax statutes and developed numerous judicial anti-abuse doctrines
aimed at curbing overly aggressive taxpayer positions.124 Even as the courts formally endorsed
the position that structuring transactions to minimize taxation was permissible, they typically
would nevertheless proceed to reject the particular tax motivated transaction in the case at
hand.125 Thus, while the law created a line between acceptable and unacceptable behavior, the
edges of that line were often ill defined.
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For illustration, the following, seemingly pro-taxpayer, quotations all come from cases where
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Creating a level of uncertainty regarding the exact boundaries of the law created
an atmosphere conducive to an efficient and fair self-assessment system. When taxpayers and
practitioners knew that courts could be expected to reject legal positions that were based on
unintended literal interpretations of the law or reached results at odds with the tax policy
underlying the law, they were encouraged to be more circumspect and even-handed in their
initial tax positions. Taxpayers would be less inclined to view the law as merely a system of
specific rules to be gamed by clever artifice since such attempts could be expected to fail.
Similarly, practitioners would be on a stronger footing in dissuading a taxpayer from undertaking
a tax motivated transaction since the likelihood of the transaction withstanding judicial scrutiny
would be greatly reduced. Thus, a strong judicial norm of dynamic interpretation of tax statutes
promoted a gatekeeping function by effectively aligning the interests of both clients and
practitioners. Expanding the area of uncertainty regarding the exact reach of the tax law both
made the legal constraint on overly aggressive planning more expansive and created room for
attorneys to assert ethical considerations as relevant to navigating the zone of legal uncertainty,
thereby allowing both ethical and legal considerations to act as constraints on aggressive
taxpayer actions.126
As the judiciary began to move away from this traditional approach to tax cases, it
created uncertainty regarding how the law should be viewed and forced practitioners to directly
face the conflict between representing their clients zealously and their role in maintaining a fair
and efficient functioning of the self-assessment system.127 Taxpayers who saw the judiciary
upholding the aggressive tax transactions of their competitors, felt compelled to engage in such
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activity themselves.128 This was both a competitive necessity and a breaking down of the moral
norm that there was an obligation to pay one’s fair share of the country’s tax burden. By giving
full voice to JP Morgan’s view of taxation, rather than mere lip service, the judiciary bolstered
the emerging business focus on profits and cost benefit analysis as the only legitimate constraints
on behavior. In turn, such business clients had no patience for attorneys who attempted to
dissuade desired transactions based solely on ethical or anti-abuse notions. Lawyers not
acceding to this new reality found themselves at a distinct disadvantage.
Further, even lawyers who traditionally would have advised against aggressive
transactions based on non-literal legal interpretations and anti-abuse notions had to question the
validity of their own legal reasoning. At its core, the job of a lawyer is to predict the future for
his clients. As courts muddied the water regarding how they would approach the application of
tax statutes, the attorney’s job became much more difficult. Even if a particular attorney
believed a tax motivated transaction was too good to be true and he would not uphold it were he
the judge, he would know that a judge with a more literalist disposition might well condone the
transaction.129 How could the attorney in good conscience advise a client against a transaction
when an identified segment of the judiciary would find the transaction perfectly legal? Given the
lawyer’s clear ethical duty to assist his client and the undeniable competitive pressure facing
him, it is little wonder that even practitioners pre-disposed to undertaking a gatekeeping function
would chose to abandon that older ethical norm as a viable standard for ongoing behavior.
4.
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Decreased Societal Impetus Toward Taxpaying

Finally, the change in the tax bar’s view of their gatekeeping role was also
influenced by broader changes in American society. Historically, there was a moral component
to taxpaying in the United States.130 While this began to give way in the 1930s131, World War II
saw a renewed patriotic impetus toward taxpaying.132 Even after the war, the United States
found itself locked in an ideological struggle with Communism that supported a taxpaying
impetus on the public.133 However, as society moved beyond these periods of crisis,134 the
viewpoint that taxation should be viewed as a purely a forced extraction of wealth from citizens
without any moral or ethical component to the obligation began to reassert itself.135
This period also saw a general decline in the level of respect for and trust in
government and other institutions.136 The portion of Americans who responded that the federal
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government can be trusted “to do what is right” most of the time or just about always fell from
76% in 1964, to 30% in 2008.137 This general decline in trust has been demonstrated to have a
direct impact on tax compliance.138 As society moved farther away from the ideal that taxpaying
was a moral and patriotic duty, the role of tax attorneys in advising their clients shifted as well.
Indeed, these same societal forces can be seen behind the general decline in the respect for
attorneys generally since the mid-1960s.139
IV.

The Future of Tax Gatekeeping
A.

Whither (or Wither) Tax Gatekeeping?
The foregoing discussion has reviewed the historical arguments for and against a

gatekeeping norm in the tax arena and shown that a gatekeeping norm existed in the past, but has
been largely abandoned today. In this Part the question is: Should we care? And if so, what can
be done to reinvigorate and reestablish a gatekeeping norm within the tax bar?
This article takes the position that we should care and that it is worthwhile to
resurrect a gatekeeping function for the tax bar. The main rationale in support of this view is the
same one expressed earlier in this article, that an attorney’s zealous advocacy role should and
must be circumscribed to ensure that the self-assessment system functions properly and that
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taxpayers continue to perceive the tax system as fair. A breakdown in respect for the tax system
could well lead to widespread tax avoidance and a breakdown of the stable taxpaying ethos in the
United States.140 A strong gatekeeping norm within the tax bar can help forestall this possibility
and promote the rule of law.
While the historical argument that an ethical gatekeeping norm was unnecessary
as sufficiently covered by an attorney’s general ethical obligations, has clearly been refuted by
the waves of tax shelter activity in recent decades, the existence of that very tax shelter activity
can be utilized to argue against continuing to assert a gatekeeping norm.141 This argument uses
the failure of the historical gatekeeping norm to prevent past tax shelter waves as evidence that
the traditionally articulated gatekeeping obligation was too ill-defined to serve as an enforceable
normative guide for actual practitioner actions.142 Hence, under this argument, advocating for a
gatekeeping function is a misguided effort that will never be able to stand up to the competitive
pressures facing practitioners and therefore can never serve as a realistic constrain on aggressive
taxpayer behavior.
It is undoubtedly true that practitioners failed abysmally as gatekeepers during the
periods of tax shelter activity in the past 40 years. However, this observed failure is most likely
due to the rejection by a majority of practitioners of gatekeeping as a legitimate ethical norm,
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despite the legal academy routinely asserting during this period that a gatekeeping role existed.143
As discussed earlier, ethical behavior is ultimately determined by the specific culture or subculture creating the norm. Merely stating that any particular norm should exist in a society is
nonsense and attempting to impose a norm from outside, without the means and will to enforce it
from outside as well, is an exercise in futility.144 To be effective, an ethical norm must reflect
the consensus of those to whom it applies and be subject to effective internal enforcement.145
While gatekeeping within the tax bar has often been proclaimed as the accepted ethical norm, at
least since the 1965 Opinion that has never been the formal opinion of the American Bar
Association.
So, it is disingenuous to suggest that the tax bar should not attempt to reach a
consensus in favor of a gatekeeping role merely because a true consensus with formal adoption
by the bar has not existed in recent times. The goal of this article is to propose a means by which
the bar may be encouraged to shoulder this burden on its own initiative in a manner that will give
both form and reality to an ethical gatekeeping norm that, in fact, has not existed in recent
memory.
An alternative response might be that Government actions have already
interceded to such a degree that recognizing an ethical norm of gatekeeping is irrelevant and
unnecessary today. Following the Government’s recent changes to Circular 230, the civil
penalty provisions, the codification of the economic substance doctrine and its efforts to increase
taxpayer disclosure of questionable transactions, there is little discretion left to tax advisors to
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promote abusive transactions or assist their clients in pursuing such schemes.146 In effect, the
failure of the bar to come to a consensus and enforce an ethical gatekeeping norm has led the
Government to impose the functional equivalent as a matter of law. As proof of this fact, one
can point to the apparent downturn in tax shelter activity in recent years.147
Of course, if this position is correct, then the bar should have no problem formally
adopting and embracing an ethical gatekeeping norm since it merely confirms the existing
legally imposed reality. Yet we see no impetus to conform the ABA’s formally announced
standards to this supposed new reality.148 Further the nature of a legally imposed rule is that it
will only apply in the specific circumstances covered, and we have seen how adept the tax bar
can be in finding loopholes in structures of legally imposed rules.149 If there is no ethical
standard to backstop the Government’s imposed rules, then there is no disincentive for attorneys
to exploit any areas not specifically governed by the legally imposed rules. In these gap areas
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tax attorneys would be free to pursue the same destructive tax shelter activity that occurred in
recent decades.
While it may turn out that the current set of rules provides an all inclusive barrier
to attorney participation in tax shelter activity, there is reason to be skeptical of this conclusion.
After the amendments to Circular 230 in the 1980s and the adoption of statutory rules to curtail
tax shelter transactions, there was a drop off in tax shelter activity for a few years before new tax
shelter schemes arose in the 1990s.150 While the Government’s actions spelled the demise of
certain types of tax shelters, the drop off in activity may have resulted merely from the retooling
of the industry. Conversely, the drop off in present day tax shelter activity may be due more to
the fact that taxpayers have less income and gain to shelter currently as a result of the worst
economic downturn in this country since the Great Depression.151 When the economy turns
around in the coming years, it is likely we will see more pressure for tax shelter transactions.
Whether the Government’s current rules will effectively contain that pressure remains to be seen.
As a final point in favor of attempting to refine and reassert a tax gatekeeping
norm, it should be noted that reaching consensus on such a norm can be seen as in the best long
term interest of both the bar and clients. The changes to Circular 230 and the penalty provisions
in response to the tax shelter wave in the 1990s have placed significant additional burdens on
practitioners and their clients.152 These rules clearly have put real constraints on the relationship
between clients and their attorneys and arguably dissuade the provision of some legitimate tax
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advice and planning.153 Should lawyer assisted tax shelter activity become rampant again in the
future, the bar should expect the Government to impose even more draconian restrictions on
them. Taking concrete steps today to prevent future abuses and thereby forestalling any further
potentially overly broad and restrictive Government intrusions into the attorney client
relationship should be supportable as in the best interest of all involved.
B.

Creating an Accepted and Sustainable Gatekeeping Norm
If a gatekeeping norm is desirable in the tax area, but appears to no longer exist,

what can be done to create one anew? Most commentators in the last few decades have
maintained that tax practitioners do have an ethical gatekeeping obligation.154 This article has
demonstrated that while, as a tax policy matter, such an ethical obligation should exist, and it
appears to in fact to have existed at least for a time, the modern reality of tax shelter activity
belies its continued existence. The problem is that ethical rules, and for that matter even rules of
law, are worthless if they are not truly accepted and internalized by the group governed by such
rules.155 So, if a gatekeeping norm is desirable, merely proclaiming its existence will do little, by
itself, to bring that norm into actual existence. This is especially true when powerful forces, both
internal and external to the group, push members of the group in the opposite direction. Reestablishing a gatekeeping norm within the tax bar requires changing the existing culture of the
tax bar, which in turn requires altering or exploiting various elements of the broader societal
milieu in which the tax bar operates.
1.
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Reaching Consensus and Announcing a Standard
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The imposition of an ethical rule on a group does not guarantee that the rule will
be followed. To achieve a practical reality, the rule must be generally accepted as correct by
those subject to it, as well as being subject to effective enforcement mechanisms to dissuade noncompliant behavior.156 Essentially, there must be a consensus regarding the rule for it to have
legitimacy. Consequently, internally debated and democratically adopted norms are the ones
most likely to be obeyed, even by those who did not originally favor the adopted norm.157 Of
course, establishing consensus around an ethical standard is immeasurably harder when there is a
pre-existing standard to the contrary.
This is unfortunately the predicament facing a renewed tax gatekeeping norm.
While the extant literature maintains practitioners have such an ethical obligation, and the
Government informally concurs, the ABA’s pronouncements in the 1965 Opinion and the 1985
Opinion are premised on treating tax practice as an adversarial endeavor.158 Despite the
proliferation of tax shelter activity in the 1990s and the significant changes to Circular 230 and
the civil penalty provisions, the ABA has not seen fit to revisit the 1985 Opinion. Further, the
broader legal profession has long embraced an all encompassing zealous advocacy norm that is
only slowly changing.
156

Id.
See, e.g., James Alm, Betty R. Jackson & Michael McKee, Fiscal Exchange, Collective
Decision Institutions and Tax Compliance, 22 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 285 (1993) (finding
higher compliance when a matter is voted on and when the outcome has wide support). Accord
T.R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990) (arguing that people comply with the law in
general if they perceive the process that leads to this law as fair); James Alm, Gary H.
McClelland & William D. Schulze, Changing the Social Norm of Tax Compliance by Voting, 52
KYKLOS 141, 163 (1999); Bruneo Feld & J.R. Tyran, Tax Evasion and Voting: An Experimental
Analysis, 55 KYKLOS 197, 218 (2002); Benno Torgler & C. A. Schaltegger, Tax Amnesties and
Political Participation, 33 PUB. FIN. REV. 403 (2005); Benno Torgler, What Do We Know about
Tax Morale and Tax Compliance?, 48 INT’L REV. ECON. & BUS. 395 (2001) (surveying literature
on political participation and compliance).
158
See text accompanying supra notes 60-67 and 82-85.
157

The first step in reviving a tax gatekeeping norm is to withdraw the 1985 Opinion
and replace it with one explicitly endorsing a gatekeeping role in tax planning. On its face this
presents a “which came first” problem, since announcing the new ethical norm would help
promote consensus around it, but consensus regarding the norm is presumably an essential
element in adopting the new norm to begin with. However, consensus is often formed thru open
discussion. Even if the required consensus is presently lacking, if the ABA were to undertake a
new study on the provision of tax advice to clients, a new consensus could well emerge from that
dialogue. Indeed, there are a number of changes in recent years that could be brought to bear in
such a discussion in favor of adopting a gatekeeping norm, including, (1) the growing academic
acceptance that restraining the zealous advocacy norm outside of (and sometimes even inside of)
litigation is legitimate159 and (2) the reality of recent direct regulation of tax practice by the
Government, and the risk of even more draconian Government regulation in the future if the bar
fails to effectively self-regulate.
Still, while beginning a real discussion of the proper role of advisors within the
tax bar is a crucial first step if an effective gatekeeping norm is to be established, there is no
guarantee that such discussions would result in that consensus. Despite the fact that restraining
its own behavior is in the best interest of the tax bar (and their clients) to avoid more
Government regulation, powerful forces push the tax bar in the other direction. These include,
among others, (1) competitive pressures which force attorneys to compete for clients based on
tax result rather than sound advice, (2) outside pressure from clients who engage in a
159
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collaborative approach to obtaining legal advice, and (3) increased uncertainty regarding the
judicial demeanor toward tax planning and statutory interpretation. If these forces are to be
overcome, some countervailing forces must be put in play to nudge the tax bar toward a
gatekeeping consensus.
2.

Seizing the Power of Individual Action and Example

Changing a cultural norm is not an easy task. Generally such norms remain stable
and resistant to change. However, when change occurs, it typically does so quickly rather than
based on a gradual shift.160 This tipping point nature of cultural norms highlights an unexpected
vehicle for prompting rapid change, individual action.161 On its face it may seem absurd to
assert that the actions of an individual, or a small cadre of individuals, could lead to a cultural
change, but even small changes to a social norm can precipitate dramatic and rapid changes
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given the right conditions.162 This insight builds on modern models of disease transmission
where once viruses reach a critical mass they spread at an exponential rate. Essentially, human
behaviors can themselves be contagious.163 In this way, if even a small group of people reject an
existing norm, others seeing their action may decide that they themselves should adopt it and
start an informational or reputational cascade effect.164 Such snowballing effects draw their
strength from the fact that most social groups strive for homogeneity.165 This tipping point effect
can apply both in the context of endorsing a new social norm, as well as condemning one.166
The same principle applies to ethical situations. While one individual cannot
singlehandedly change the world, he can influence those around him in ways that ultimately have
profound consequences.167 Imagine a crowd of people gathered for a peaceful protest. One
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individual’s unilateral act of violence does not convert the protesters into a mob. However, the
way that others respond might. If no one objects to the violence, then that sends a message to
others in the crowd that the group finds violence acceptable, and the peaceful protest may
quickly cascade into mayhem. Conversely, if members of the crowd censure and act against the
initial violence, the peaceful purpose of the group is reaffirmed and cohesion to the original norm
is maintained. One individual cannot unilaterally impose an ethical change on a group, but his
example can prompt others to question their views.168 When a person takes a principled stand in
the face of a contrary norm, the present has been changed for those around him and who knows
what good may ultimately arise in the future as a result.
So, this article presents a plea to practitioners to raise concerns with clients even
when it is uncomfortable to do so. Even if an attorney feels constrained to provide zealous
advice to a client, they should note that there is still a moral dimension to the question as well as
a purely legal one. By standing up for a duty to the system and noting the harm a tax avoidance
transaction presents to the system, the practitioner may give his client or other attorneys dealing
with the transaction, the strength to question their own views about the appropriateness of their
actions, even if technically legal. By doing so, the attorney not only impacts the group dynamic
within the business ethics context, but serves as an example that can serve as the tipping point for
other tax lawyers to question the true ethical norms in play. This is not to say that speaking out
is easy, as it may cause risks for those who do it, but the more it is done the better.
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Further, outside specific client settings, it is especially important that high profile
tax practitioners and academics take up the cause and publically advocate for a strong
gatekeeping norm since these trend setters will have an outsized impact on the behavior of
others.169 Consequently, anything that can be done to make it easier for an attorney to follow
their conscience should be done to promote individual action and the importance of individual
action should not be easily dismissed.
3.

Encouraging Gatekeeping

Hastening a consensus regarding tax gatekeeping will require the creation of
incentives for individual attorneys, and the bar as a whole, to willingly assume a gatekeeping
function.170 One means of achieving this is to appeal to their self-interest. As discussed earlier,
one element of self-interest, avoiding future Government regulation of the profession, is already
present. However, other factors discourage attorneys from counseling clients against aggressive
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positions; including a fear that raising concern about technically legal transactions would result
in losing that client’s future business. To change this dynamic, it is necessary to (1) create a
conflict of interest that requires attorneys to raise the broader ethical considerations despite
general business distain for such considerations, and/or (2) change the prevailing business norms
to be more receptive to considerations other than profit maximization and strict legal compliance.
One way of creating such a conflict of interest would be for the Government to
pursue a more public and targeted enforcement effort on the clients of practitioners who advised
on an aggressive transaction in the past. This would have a two pronged effect. When advising
a particular client who is seeking aggressive advice, the practitioner would need to consider not
only the interests of the current client, but the interests of his other clients and his own future
livelihood. If being overly zealous for one client puts other clients at higher risk for audit, then
that conflict of interest could prompt the attorney to temper his advice. Further, acceding to the
aggressive advice desired by a client would potentially jeopardize the attorney’s future earnings
since other clients would be less inclined to hire a representative who would draw heightened
scrutiny to them. Indeed, such publicized enforcement activity can help reduce the competitive
pressures that lead to a legal race to the bottom. A taxpayer who knows that aggressive tax
planners serve as audit lightning rods have an incentive to seek out practitioners who have a
good reputation with the Government (and presumably are more even handed in their legal
conclusions).171
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An alternative means to achieve this impact would be to require taxpayers to disclose on their
tax return that they received negative advice regarding a particular transaction or position taken
on the return. Thus, even if they were able to ultimately shift to a lawyer with a more lenient
bent, they would still need to disclose the earlier negative advice. Thus, a lawyer potentially
issuing negative advice would have more sway to persuade the client to pursue a less aggressive
course rather than merely having the client simply shop for more lenient advice.

The Government could also take a more direct approach to intentionally create
conflicts of interest between tax lawyers and their clients. For instance, the Government could
modify the attorney-client privilege in tax situations or override normal client confidentiality
rules by legally requiring certain disclosures to the Government of specified client actions.172
Indeed, in promulgating regulations dealing with the disclosure of certain reportable transactions,
the Government, perhaps inadvertently, created just such a conflict of interest.173 Of course at
the extreme the Government could potentially eliminate all privilege or confidentiality for tax
planning matters and then even require practitioners to report aggressive client activity.174 But
this is exactly the type of Government interference with the profession that everyone would
agree would be detrimental to all involved. However, Government actions touching on these
matters at the margins could be effective in both encouraging attorneys to generally distance
their legal considerations from their client’s business goals and highlight in a tangible way the
real risk to the tax bar associated with a continued unwillingness to effectively self-regulate.
As discussed in the next section, the other way to encourage attorneys to question
the advisability of aggressive but arguably legal transactions is to make such considerations more
germane to the clients being served by the attorney and thereby relieve some of the outside
pressures acting to suppress a gatekeeping function.
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4.

Relieving the Anti-Gatekeeping Pressure

A primary reason tax lawyers hesitate to raise issues regarding aggressive tax
planning is that their clients are unlikely to be receptive to such “non-legal” advice coming from
their legal advisors.175 Businesses in the United States are focused primarily on their bottom line
and consequently view the law as merely a system of rules to be gamed for the sole goal of profit
maximization.176 Under this approach, as long as a transaction is technically “legal” then it
should be pursued to obtain the expected economic benefit irrespective of any non-financial
considerations.177 This is compounded by the conventional wisdom that taxpaying is an area of
purely legal inquiry, devoid of any moral considerations178 and by general societal trends that
weaken the taxpaying norm.179 A lawyer’s ability to counsel against this approach to applying
the tax laws is made almost impossibly difficult when the judiciary actually endorses such a
literalistic approach to interpreting the tax laws.180 Given the uncertainty today regarding
judicial attitudes, a lawyer may be hard pressed to refuse to advise against an aggressive
transaction where a literalist court may well uphold the transaction. Consequently, clarifying the
proper method of statutory interpretation in tax cases is absolutely crucial to reestablishing a tax
gatekeeping norm.181 While recent court decisions have moved back toward traditional antiabuse notions in scrutinizing tax motivated transactions, the underlying schism within the
judiciary and the academy regarding the interpretation of statutes remains.182 While the
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Government has taken an important step toward clarifying this matter by codifying the economic
substance doctrine, more should be done to solidify judicial approaches in this area and thereby
reduce the uncertainty for practitioners in predicting the likely judicial response to an aggressive
transaction. There are several mechanisms by which this could be done. First, a general antiabuse rule could be statutorily adopted.183 This has been done in several countries with generally
positive effect, despite practitioner criticism.184 Alternatively, given the long history of
judicially created anti-abuse doctrines in the United States, a simpler approach would be to
merely statutorily reaffirm the appropriateness of courts continuing to apply such doctrines and
to eschew literal interpretations of the Code that are at odds with the intended purpose and scope
of the subject provisions.185
Another approach for making businesses more receptive to cautionary advice
from their attorneys would be to alter the business culture of their clients using public censure.186
In the past, public outcry over corporations expatriating to avoid US taxes was brought to bear to
question, or try to reverse, a number of such transactions.187 Today many corporations pay very
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low effective tax rates.188 Publicizing such rates might well create a public outcry demanding
that corporate citizens pay their fair share of the tax burden as well.189
V.

Conclusion
This article has demonstrated that the tax bar’s failure to effectively constrain its

actions on behalf of clients has forced the Government to impose constraints on the tax bar
through direct regulation. As has happened with securities lawyers, this direct Government
regulation could become even more onerous if the tax bar fails to embrace a strong gatekeeping
function on its own. In order to preserve the traditional and important tax planning role of
attorneys in business and personal planning situations, the bar must be willing to curb its support
for aggressive tax planning techniques. While this will require a departure from traditional
notions that every client must be represented zealously without consideration of ancillary adverse
consequences to society or third parties (including the attorney himself), it is in line with both the
historical approach to practicing tax law and emerging trends arguing in favor of a general
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obligation of attorneys to counterbalance their zealous advocacy for a client against a duty to
support and strengthen the substantive body of law in which they practice.
The tax bar should begin a forthright discussion of these issues immediately, with
the goal of reaching a strong consensus in favor of adopting a formal ethical gatekeeping norm.
Achieving this consensus will require weakening the competitive and other forces which align
attorneys too closely with a client’s profit maximization goals, but with sufficient resolve on the
part of a cadre of attorneys who see the stakes involved, these forces can be overcome.
Looking beyond the tax bar, the implications of how the degradation of a
gatekeeping norm in the tax area has impacted tax practitioners should serve as a warning to all
lawyers to heed calls for a gatekeeping function in their particular fields. While historically it
has been argued that the tax field is unique in this regard due to the self-assessment nature of the
income tax, that uniqueness is less true today. As the United States moves ever closer to a
regulatory state where more and more individual and business action is circumscribed by
detailed statutory and regulatory frameworks, attorneys will be increasingly called on to promote
adherence to these rules. A zealous advocacy norm will promote game playing with these
frameworks and ultimately harm the rule of law. Additionally, many of the forces described
herein that have caused tax practitioners to eschew their historical gatekeeping function find
direct analogues in other practice areas. The tax experience provides a cautionary tale for the
entire bar on the importance of affirmatively embracing a gatekeeping function as a means of
saving a zealous advocacy norm that otherwise could be completely swept away.

